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ABSTRACT 
Domain-General Categorization in 14- to 24-month-old Infants 
Kristin Rostad 
The current experiments were concerned with the development of object 
categorization skills during the second year of life. Experiment 1 examined whether 18-
and 24-month-old infants were capable of performing categorization at the domain-
general level (i.e., very broad categories of animate and inanimate objects) using a 
sequential touching procedure. The 18-month-old infants categorized the objects at an 
above-chance level, but the 24-month-olds did not. However, the 24-month-olds 
demonstrated a higher percentage of cross-category touching (i.e., putting people on 
vehicles and furniture), which would make it difficult to demonstrate categorization using 
this particular procedure. In Experiment 2, 14-, 18-, and 24-month-old infants 
participated in a sequential touching task in which the part features of animate and 
inanimate objects were modified, allowing for a comparison of leg/wheel categorization 
(i.e., perceptually-based) and animate/inanimate categorization (i.e., conceptually based). 
None of the age groups performed either leg/wheel or animate/inanimate categorization 
at a level significantly greater than chance. Taken together, these results demonstrate that 
infants are capable of categorizing at a broad level during the middle of the second year 
of life, and that they do not use perceptual features as the sole basis for this 
categorization. 
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Domain-General Categorization in 14- to 24-month-old Infants 
Categorization involves the ability to classify distinctive objects into the same 
group according to some principle or rule (Oakes & Rakison, 2003). For example, we are 
able to categorize German Shepherds and Chihuahuas into the same category of 'dogs,' 
even though they look quite different from one another. The ability to categorize is 
important for a number of reasons. First, it places fewer demands on the limited human 
memory system (Oakes & Rakison, 2003). Instead of having to recall the features of 
every individual category member, we can remember the general properties of the entire 
group. Second, categorization allows us to make inferences about new category members 
based on what we already know about the characteristics of that category (Quinn, 2002). 
For example, if you learn that dogs bark and then you encounter a novel dog, you can 
infer that this dog will also bark even though you may never hear it do so. 
Categorization skills develop, and are especially important, in the first few years 
of life (Oakes & Rakison, 2003). Without this ability, infants and young children would 
have to process and respond to each entity as entirely novel, an impossible feat given the 
infinite number of variations in the world around us. Also, studying categorization 
provides insight into other skills that are developing in early childhood, such as language 
and memory (Mareschal, Powell, & Volein, 2003). Examining how and when 
categorization skills develop has been an active field of study for investigators over the 
past several decades (Quinn, 2005). 
Categorization abilities in infancy can be examined in a number of different ways. 
For very young infants (e.g., 3- to 4-month-olds), the familiarization/novelty-preference 
procedure is often used (Oakes & Rakison, 2003). Similar to any habituation paradigm, 
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infants are first presented with numerous instances from one category (e.g., dogs) until 
they become habituated (i.e., looking time decreases significantly). In the test phase, the 
infants are presented with a novel instance from the familiar category (i.e., new dog) and 
a novel instance from an unfamiliar category (e.g., cat). If the infants look longer at the 
cat, it is assumed that the novel dog exemplar has been categorized with the dogs 
presented during familiarization. 
When infants reach approximately 7 months of age, it is possible to switch from 
an image-based paradigm to a more hands-on, object-based paradigm (Oakes & Rakison, 
2003). The object examination procedure is similar to the familiarization/novelty-
preference procedure, except that objects are used instead of pictures. Habituation occurs 
when infants significantly decrease the time they spend visually and physically 
examining the objects. Categorization is also demonstrated in a comparable way to the 
familiarization/novelty-preference procedure (i.e., if the infants do not show an increase 
in examination time to a novel instance from the familiarized category). 
Another paradigm used to study infant categorization with slightly older infants is 
the sequential touching procedure (Quinn, 2002). This technique involves presenting 
infants with an array of objects consisting of exemplars from two categories (e.g., 
animals and vehicles). The touching behaviour of the infants is examined in order to 
determine whether there is any systematic order to their touches. The infants are 
considered to have categorized the objects if they touch multiple objects from the same 
category at a level greater than chance (Mandler, Fivush, & Reznick, 1987). 
A final test procedure, generalized imitation, examines the extent to which infants 
will generalize a modeled action (Mandler & McDonough, 1996). During the 
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familiarization phase, the experimenter demonstrates an action with a test object (e.g., a 
dog drinking from a cup). In the test phase, infants are given a choice between a same-
category exemplar (e.g., a horse) and an other-category exemplar (e.g., a car) to model 
the action. Categorization is inferred if the infants choose to generalize the action to the 
same-category exemplar at a level greater than chance. These test paradigms have been 
used to address a number of issues in the categorization literature, including the 
development of categories at variable levels of inclusiveness and the role of perceptual 
and conceptual processes in categorization. 
Category Inclusiveness 
Categories vary in their degree of inclusiveness. The category of 'dogs' is 
considered a basic-level category, which can be divided into less inclusive categories. 
These lower-level categories are known as subordinate-level categories, and in this 
instance would be made up of different types of dogs (e.g., terrier, dalmation, etc.). The 
basic-level 'dog' category can also be subsumed as part of a more inclusive category of 
'animals,' which is termed a superordinate-level category. Finally, the 'dog' category is 
also part of an even broader category of 'animates.' This category would extend to 
include both humans and animals. At the highest level of inclusivity, animate and 
inanimate categories are termed domain-general categories. Categorization skills can be 
flexible such that the same entity (e.g., dog) can be categorized in different ways 
depending on the demands of the situation (Ellis & Oakes, 2006). For example, the dog 
may be regarded at a different level of category inclusiveness depending on whether it is 
surrounded by only other dogs or by a variety of other animals. 
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Researchers have debated over the level of categorization that is acquired earliest 
in infancy. Some researchers argue that the basic-level categories develop first because 
they have highly similar within-category features and highly dissimilar between-category 
features (e.g., Mervis & Rosch, 1981). These bottom-up theorists would argue that more 
inclusive categories are formed out of already acquired, lower-level categories (Mandler 
& Bauer, 1988). Others propose that children first acquire broader categories and learn to 
distinguish among the more specific categories as they get older (e.g., Mandler, 2003). 
This top-down hypothesis has received a great deal of research support. 
Mandler and Bauer (1988) presented infants with superordinate- and basic-level 
categories in a sequential touching task. They found evidence of basic-level 
categorization at 16 and 20 months of age, but only when the basic-level categories came 
from differing superordinate categories. That is, the infants could categorize dogs vs. cars 
(different superordinate-level categories), but not cars vs. trucks (same superordinate-
level category). The authors took this to suggest that sensitivity to superordinate-level 
categories develops before sensitivity to basic-level categories. 
Similar results were also found by Mandler, Bauer, and McDonough (1991) with 
18-month-old infants. Using a sequential touching task, the authors found that infants 
were able to differentiate superordinate-level categories (animals vs. vehicles) but not 
basic-level categories of low contrast (e.g., dogs vs. horses) or moderate contrast (e.g., 
cars vs. motorcycles). The only evidence of basic-level categorization was found using a 
high degree of contrast (e.g., dogs vs. fish). By 30 months of age the infants were capable 
of discriminating low and moderate degrees of contrast. 
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Another set of studies provided further evidence for the primacy of superordinate-
level categories with even younger infants using an object examination task (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993; 1998a). In the first study, both 9- and 11-month-old infants were 
found to categorize superordinate-level categories of animals and vehicles (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993). They also discovered superordinate-level categorization with a 
group of 7-month-old infants, but at a slightly lower level of performance than the older 
children. In the second study the authors found further evidence of superordinate-level 
categorization in 7- to 11-month-old infants (Mandler & McDonough, 1998a). In line 
with other research (e.g., Mandler, et al., 1991), they also found that basic-level 
categorization developed after superordinate-level categorization, and tended to begin 
with basic-level categories with a high degree of contrast (e.g., dogs vs. birds). 
This area of research was extended by Poulin-Dubois, Graham, and Sippola 
(1995) to include superordinate-, basic-, and subordinate-level categories. Using a 
sequential touching task, the authors examined the categorization skills of the same set of 
infants using a longitudinal design. They found evidence of superordinate-level 
categorization (e.g., animals vs. furniture) by 15 months of age, followed by basic-level 
categorization (e.g., cars vs. trucks) developing around 20 months of age. The infants did 
not display evidence of subordinate-level categorization (e.g., collies vs. German 
shepherds) even by 25 months of age. 
A second longitudinal study also found evidence of superordinate-level 
categorization prior to basic-level categorization (Pauen, 2002). Using an object 
examination procedure, Pauen (2002) discovered that 8-month-old infants were capable 
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of categorizing objects at the superordinate level, but not at the basic level. By 12 months 
of age, the same infants were able to demonstrate basic-level categorization. 
Taken together these results support the hypothesis of a superordinate-to-basic-
level progression of categorization in early infancy. One study demonstrated that 
subordinate-level distinctions may appear after basic-level distinctions (Poulin-Dubois et 
al., 1995), adding further support to the top-down hypothesis. There is also evidence that 
basic-level categories that do develop early tend to be high contrast comparisons (e.g., 
dogs vs. fish; Mandler, et al., 1991; Mandler & McDonough, 1998a). However, only one 
study has attempted to examine the development of categories even broader than the 
superordinate level. 
Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, and Johnson (2006) used a generalized 
imitation procedure to examine whether infants would extend motion and sensory 
properties between people and animal exemplars (i.e., within the animate domain-general 
category). Specifically, the researchers demonstrated actions using people exemplars, and 
infants were given the choice to imitate the action with either an animal or a vehicle 
exemplar. Both the 16- and 20-month-old infants tested were more likely to extend the 
actions to the animal exemplars than to the vehicle exemplars, providing some evidence 
for the presence of a broad domain-general category of animate objects. 
As stated above, lower-level categories can be subsumed as part of higher-level, 
more inclusive categories. That is, superordinate-level categories are made up of a 
number of basic-level categories, and domain-general categories are made up of 
superordinate-level categories. While many studies have examined superordinate-level 
categories that combine to form domain-general categories of animates and inanimates, 
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only one has attempted to investigate how and when infants begin to categorize at this 
broad, domain-general level (e.g., Poulin-Dubois et al., 2006). If the top-down hypothesis 
of category development is correct (i.e., broader categories appear first), it would be 
important to explore whether domain-general categorization can be detected as early as, 
or even earlier than, superordinate-level categorization. 
Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Categorization 
Alongside category inclusiveness, a second area of debate in the categorization 
literature concerns the information that infants use to make category judgments (Poulin-
Dubois et al., 2006). Some researchers argue that only perceptual features, such as visible 
object parts (e.g., legs, wheels), are used by infants to form categories below the age of 
22 months (e.g., Rakison, 2003). Others maintain that infants use more conceptual 
representations about 'knowing' what something is to distinguish between categories 
(e.g., Mandler, 2003). Specifically, these researchers would argue that infants make 
conceptual categorical distinctions based on functional, causal, or structural properties 
(Poulin-Dubois et al., 2006). 
In support of the perceptual approach, Quinn, Eimas, and Tarr (2001) 
demonstrated the importance of shape information in early categorization. Using a 
familiarization/novelty-preference procedure, they found that 3- to 4-month-old infants 
were able to discriminate dog and cat shapes. The infants were only presented with 
silhouettes, and they were able to discriminate between members of different categories 
when they were given silhouettes solely of the head region. This supports the notion that 
perceptual features, such as object shape, are an important part of early categorization. 
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A study by Oakes, Coppage, and Dingel (1997) illustrated the importance of 
perceptual variability when 10- and 13-month-old infants are forming categories. The 
infants were familiarized with category exemplars that had either highly similar features 
or highly variable features. Overall, the infants were more likely to display a novelty-
preference when they had been familiarized with exemplars that were perceptually 
similar. That is, the infants more easily formed categories when the category members 
looked alike. There was a trend for the older infants to form categories even with 
exemplars with highly variable features. The results of this study highlight the role of 
perceptual factors when forming categories. 
Rakison and Butterworth (1998) were specifically interested in whether 
perceptual features, such as object parts, would influence categorization. Using a 
sequential touching procedure, they found that 14-, 18-, and 22-month-old infants readily 
made the distinction between objects with legs and objects with wheels. However, the 
two younger age groups had difficulty distinguishing within the legged objects. That is, 
they were capable of distinguishing categories with different part features (e.g., cars with 
wheels vs. animals with legs), but were unable to distinguish categories with similar part 
features (e.g., animals with legs vs. furniture with legs). The researchers concluded that 
the infants were categorizing primarily based on part features. 
In a second experiment, Rakison and Butterworth (1998) manipulated the part 
features of a number of animal and vehicle exemplars. Again using a sequential touching 
paradigm, the authors tested 14-, 18-, and 22-month-old infants. In a control task with 
normal objects (i.e., animals with legs, vehicles with wheels), all of the age groups were 
able to successfully distinguish the categories. In the experimental conditions, the objects 
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had either matched-parts (i.e., animals with wheels and legs, vehicles with wheels and 
legs), no matched-parts (i.e., animals with no wheels or legs, vehicles with no wheels or 
legs), or switched-parts (i.e., animals with wheels, vehicles with legs). 
In the matched-parts and no matched-parts conditions, none of the age groups 
were able to differentiate between the categories (Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). That is, 
when the exemplars possessed the same part features (i.e., legs and wheels) or shared no 
salient part features (i.e., no legs or wheels), the infants did not distinguish between the 
animal and vehicle category members. In the switched-parts condition, both the 14- and 
18-month-olds categorized the exemplars according to part features (i.e., legs or wheels) 
and not according to their ontological categories (i.e., animals or vehicles). By 22 months 
of age, the infants were not categorizing the objects based on part features. The authors 
argue that these results strongly support the prominence of perceptual information in 
categorization, even among infants up to 18 months of age. 
Opposing the perceptual interpretation of early categorization are the conceptual 
theorists. They would argue that excessive reliance on perceptual features is a 
disadvantage, and can actually be misleading (Madole & Oakes, 1999). For example, 
when forming a category of animals, perceptual input would indicate that most animals 
have legs. However, would this lead to the conclusion that legged tables belong in the 
animal category, but legless fish do not (Mandler, 2003)? A greater reliance on 
conceptual features would be advantageous, because the nonobvious properties of 
category members are more stable (Madole & Oakes, 1999). Fish would be grouped in 
the category of animals if one of the inclusion criteria was self-initiated motion, a 
nonobvious but stable property of animals, and this would also serve to exclude tables. 
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Mandler (e.g., 1992; 1997; 1999; 2003) has been one of the most prominent 
supporters of the conceptual approach to early categorization. Mandler argues that there 
are two different processes for obtaining perceptual and conceptual information, and that 
they are developing simultaneously almost from birth (Mandler, 2000). Mandler 
emphasizes the importance of concepts because they are what allow infants to notice the 
important perceptual associations (Mandler, 2003). This idea is in sharp contrast to the 
perceptual theorists who argue that perceptual associations are what eventually lead to 
concepts (Rakison, 2003). 
Mandler has proposed a process of perceptual analysis through which perceptual 
information 'becomes' conceptual (Mandler, 1992). Theoretically, the infant actively 
recodes perceptual input into a meaning that is accessible through an image schema. The 
earliest image schemas are believed to be related to motion, something that infants are 
especially attracted to. According to Mandler, infants first code motion cues, such as 
animacy, which are later associated with perceptual cues, such as what animate things 
look like. Importantly, she believes that the infants are not simply perceiving motion 
cues, but they are actively interpreting and recoding them (Mandler, 2000). 
Conceptual theorists often attempt to demonstrate that categories can be formed 
among exemplars despite a lack of perceptual similarity. If categories can be formed 
among dissimilar looking exemplars, there must be some basis for the categorization that 
is not readily observable. That is, the infants must be using nonobvious or conceptual 
information as the basis for grouping the exemplars. 
Mandler and McDonough (1996) used the generalized imitation technique to 
determine the extent to which 14-month-old infants would generalize a demonstrated 
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action. Experimenters demonstrated either animal properties (e.g., drinking from a cup) 
or vehicle properties (e.g., giving a ride) with the appropriate exemplars. When the 
infants were given the opportunity to imitate the actions, they were significantly more 
likely to use a same-category exemplar. For example, if the infants viewed a dog drinking 
from a cup and were given a rabbit or a truck to imitate with, they were more likely to use 
the rabbit to demonstrate the action. These results provide some support for the 
conceptual theory of categorization because the infants were overriding a certain level of 
perceptual dissimilarity (i.e., rabbits do not look exactly like dogs). 
In their second experiment, Mandler and McDonough (1996) found the same 
pattern of results even when atypical exemplars such as anteaters were used, which would 
have increased the perceptual variability of the category members. In a third experiment, 
the experimenters modeled the original action on both appropriate and inappropriate 
exemplars. For example, drinking from a cup was demonstrated with both a dog and a 
car. However, the infants chose to generalize the action only to the appropriate category 
exemplars. Even after seeing an animal and a vehicle drinking from a cup, the 14-month-
olds would only demonstrate the action with the animal exemplars, thus displaying some 
conceptual knowledge of the kinds of things that drink from cups. However, this 
technique has been criticized because the infants could be using perceptual matching to 
determine which exemplar is more appropriate for modeling (Rakison, 2003). That is, the 
matching of part features may actually be the basis for generalization (i.e., infants choose 
the object with the most perceptual features in common with the object that the 
experimenter used to demonstrate). 
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A second study by Mandler and McDonough (1998b) was conducted to refute this 
claim. A distinction was made between domain-neutral actions and domain-specific 
actions. Domain-neutral actions were considered to be equally appropriate for both 
animals and vehicles (e.g., going into a building), but domain-specific actions were 
appropriate for only one category (e.g., drinking from a cup is only appropriate for 
animals). The 14-month-old infants in this study generalized the domain-specific actions 
to the appropriate categories, as was found in Mandler and McDonough (1996). 
However, they were equally likely to generalize the domain-neutral actions to both 
categories (Mandler & McDonough, 1998b). For example, even after seeing a dog go into 
a building, the infants were equally likely to later demonstrate the action with either a cat 
or a car. If the infants had simply been attempting to perceptually match their object to 
the exemplar used by the experimenter, this pattern of results would not have been found. 
The authors also argued that this provides evidence that the infants possess some 
conceptual knowledge of what animals and vehicles can do (i.e., both vehicles and 
animals can go into buildings, but only animals drink from cups). 
This research has demonstrated that very young infants are able to categorize 
objects despite perceptual dissimilarities, therefore seemingly based on more conceptual 
reasoning (Mandler & McDonough, 1996; 1998b). However, the Rakison and 
Butterworth (1998) study found almost a complete lack of conceptual categorization, 
even up to 22 months of age. In the switched-parts condition, the 14- and 18-month-olds 
tended to group animals with legs with vehicles with legs, or animals with wheels with 
vehicles with wheels, with no obvious conceptual basis for grouping them in such a way. 
Given these striking findings, it would be important to carry out a second study with 
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switched-part objects to determine whether the results can be replicated. Also, it would 
be pertinent to examine the relative role of perceptual and conceptual factors within the 
different levels of categorization. Perceptual features may be most important for lower-
level category distinctions; different types of dogs have many perceptual features in 
common. However, conceptual factors may be more important for higher-level category 
distinctions; vehicles and furniture, as part of the inanimate domain-general category, 
have very few perceptual features in common. 
The goal of the current studies was to examine the development of domain-
general categories in infancy. Experiment 1 attempted to examine the age at which 
infants are capable of domain-general categorization. Experiment 2 was designed to 
explore the potential role of perceptual and conceptual processes in categorizing at the 
domain-general level. Taken together, these studies address both of the outlined areas of 
debate in the categorization literature. 
Experiment 1 
Surprisingly, to date, only one study has examined whether infants can form 
categories at a higher level of inclusiveness than animals, people, vehicles, and furniture 
(Poulin-Dubois et al., 2006). If infants have a broad animate category, they should group 
people and animals together in one category. Similarly, if they possess a broad inanimate 
category, they should group vehicles and furniture together. Research has shown that 
superordinate-level categories seem to develop prior to basic-level categories (e.g., 
Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler et al., 1991, Mandler & McDonough, 1993; 1998a). 
Assuming that categorization progresses in a top-down fashion, infants should be capable 
of domain-general categorization at the same age as, or earlier than, superordinate-level 
14 
categorization. Experiment 1 assessed whether 18- and 24-month-old infants were 
capable of categorizing at the domain-general level. 
Method 
Participants. 
Thirty-one 18-month-old infants (M age = 18.61 months, SD = 0.65, range = 
17.41 to 19.67 months) and 37 24-month-old infants (M age = 24.21, SD = 0.85, range = 
22.72 to 25.87 months) participated in Experiment 1. Two additional 18-month-olds 
participated but were excluded due to parental interference (N=l) and fussiness (N= 1). 
Two additional 24-month-olds participated but were excluded because of fussiness (N = 
1) and experimenter error (N= 1). The 18-month-old sample consisted of 19 males and 
12 females, and the 24-month-old sample consisted of 18 males and 19 females. 
Families were recruited through birth lists provided by a governmental health 
office (see Appendix A for recruitment letter). All infants were born full-term and had no 
visual or auditory difficulties as reported by parents. Children were from families who 
spoke either English or French at home, although many also had exposure to second (N = 
22) and third languages (N = 6). They were tested in their dominant language and, given 
the non-linguistic nature of the task, language exposure was not expected to impact 
performance. 
Materials. 
Small, plastic three-dimensional objects were used. The animate domain 
exemplars consisted of eight people (African American man, African American woman, 
African American boy, African American girl, Caucasian man, Caucasian woman, 
Caucasian boy, Caucasian girl) and four animals (dog, cow, dolphin, eagle). The 
15 
inanimate domain exemplars consisted of four vehicles (truck, car, boat, airplane) and 
four pieces of furniture (chair, desk, bed, bathtub; see Figure 1 for a photograph of all 
exemplars). The objects ranged in size from 1.90 x 4.20 x 6.50 cm to 13.10 x 3.50 x 7.80 
cm, and were presented to the infant on a 44.80 x 34.60 cm tray. A brown cloth was used 
to cover the objects, and a Thermor stopwatch was used to monitor trial length. The 
testing session was recorded through a Sony video camera on a Hi-8 video cassette tape. 
Procedure and Design. 
When families arrived for their session appointment they were greeted by two 
experimenters and were escorted to a reception room where one parent was asked to 
complete an informed consent form and a demographics questionnaire (see Appendices B 
and C). During this time, one experimenter explained the testing procedure to the parent 
while the other experimenter played with the infant. Parents were informed of the nature 
of the task, and were asked not to interfere with the procedure or to label any of the 
objects. After these instructions, the parent and child were led into an adjacent testing 
room. The infant was seated either on his or her parent's lap or in a clip-on chair attached 
to the table, with the parent sitting directly behind. The experimenter was seated directly 
across the table from the infant. 
Prior to the testing session, the objects were selected from one of six testing 
arrays (see Appendix D). Each array consisted of eight objects, four from the animate 
domain and four from the inanimate domain. These objects were arranged on the tray in a 
random fashion, and then covered with the brown cloth. The tray was kept on a table next 
to the experimenter, and was out of the infant's view. After the infant was seated, the tray 
was placed on the table in front of the experimenter, but out of the infant's reach. The 
16 
experimenter removed the cloth and made a sweeping hand motion over the tray while 
saying "Look at all of these toys. These are all for you." They tray was then pushed 
towards the child, and he or she was given 2 min to freely manipulate the objects. No 
further prompting was given unless the child did not touch any new object (or touched no 
objects) for more than 30 s, in which case the sweeping hand motion and original 
statement were repeated. If an object fell off the table, the parent or experimenter picked 
it up and inconspicuously placed it back on the tray. 
Coding. 
The sequence of touches to the objects was coded. The interpretation of the 
sequential touching procedure is that if infants are manipulating objects from a given 
category in a sequence greater than that expected by chance, they must be doing so based 
on object relatedness or category membership (Mandler et al., 1987). In order to be 
considered a touch, the infant needed to make physical contact using a finger, hand or 
another object, and the contact needed to be accompanied by eye gaze. Accidental 
touches or brushes against objects were not considered intentional and were not counted. 
In order to determine whether categorization had occurred, a mean run length 
(MRL) score was calculated for each infant. MRL is determined by dividing the total 
number of touches by the total number of runs. A run occurs when a sequence of touches 
are from within the same category (e.g., a touch sequence of car-boat-bathtub would be 
considered an inanimate run). A run of only one touch would indicate that the infant 
touched one object from one of the domain-general categories, followed by a touch to the 
other domain-general category. 
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If an interval of more than 10 s occurred between the end of one touch and the 
beginning of the next touch, a break in the sequence was recorded (Poulin-Dubois et al., 
1995). The 10 s break criterion is used in sequential touching coding because if a 
significant length of time has passed between two touches, the infant may not make any 
conceptual link between them. That is, a touch to the desk exemplar followed 25 s later 
by a touch to the truck exemplar may not be evidence of inanimate categorization. 
However, a short time interval between touches can be interpreted as more likely that the 
child has associated the two objects. If a break was recorded, it would interrupt any 
ongoing run. 
Whenever the same object was touched twice or more in succession, only 1 touch 
was recorded (Starkey, 1981). If 10 s elapsed between touches to the same object, both 
touches were recorded but with a break between them. When two objects were deemed to 
be touched simultaneously, they were recorded as one touch (Poulin-Dubois et al., 1995). 
If these objects were from the same domain-general category (e.g., car and desk), they 
were considered part of any ongoing run. If these objects were from different domain-
general categories (e.g., cow and bathtub), the simultaneous touch would break any 
ongoing run. Whenever a dropped object was replaced by the parent or experimenter and 
was immediately touched by the infant, this touch was not counted and did not break any 
ongoing run. A blank coding sheet for the animate/inanimate trials can be found in 
Appendix E, along with an example of a completed coding sheet, including MRL 
calculation, in Appendix F. 
One MRL was calculated for overall animate/inanimate categorization. Once 
calculated, the infant MRLs were compared to a MRL expected by chance if the objects 
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were touched randomly. This chance value (1.75) is calculated based on the number of 
categories and the number of exemplars within each category (Mandler et al., 1987). The 
formula derives from the fact that once an item has been touched, there are n - 1 objects 
left from that category that could be touched, and n items from the other category: 
n - 1 
n In 
MRL= x 
n - 1 n - 1 ^
 2 
I2#i - l j 
A second coder, an undergraduate-level student naive to the experimental 
hypotheses, independently coded 25% of the infants (at least one infant from each testing 
array). Interrater reliability was obtained by calculating a percentage of agreement for the 
order in which the items were touched. Average agreement was 88.29% for the 18-
month-olds and 94.78% for the 24-month-olds. 
Results and Discussion 
One-sample t-tests were used to compare infant MRLs to the MRL expected by 
chance (1.75). Preliminary analyses revealed no significant gender differences in MRL 
for either age group, and therefore all further analyses were collapsed across gender. 
The average MRL for each age group is presented in Table 1. The 18-month-old 
infants had an average MRL (M = 2.02, SD = 0.73) that was significantly greater than 
chance, t(30) = 2,07, p = .047, whereas the average MRL for the 24-month-olds (M = 
1.72, SD = 0.42) was not above chance, r(36) = -.43, p = .67. An independent-samples t-
test revealed that the average MRL of the 18-month-olds was significantly higher than 
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the average MRL of the 24-month-olds, t(66) = 2.13, p = .04. Fifty-eight percent of the 
18-month-old infants (N = 18) had a MRL greater than the chance MRL value of 1.75, 
whereas only 32% of the 24-month-olds (N = 12) had a MRL above the chance value. An 
independent-samples t-test demonstrated that the 18-month-olds had a significantly 
higher percentage of MRLs above chance than the 24-month-olds, t(66) = 2.16, p = .03. 
It would be expected that once infants are capable of categorizing at a certain 
level of abstraction (e.g., superordinate-level categorization), this ability should be 
maintained as the infant matures (i.e., the ability to categorize at the superordinate-level 
should not be 'lost'). The 18-month-olds in this study were successfully categorizing at 
the domain-general level but the 24-month-olds were not, which shows an unexpected 
age-related decline. However, it is first important to determine that this is not due to some 
systematic difference in the touching behaviours of the different age groups. The average 
number of touches for the 18- and 24-month-old infants were compared using an 
independent-samples t-test. No significant age difference was found in average number of 
touches (18-month-olds: M = 15.81, SD = 5.67, 24-month-olds: M = 16.32, SD = 4.81), 
f(66) = -.41, p = .69. These results indicate that the 24-month-olds did not simply touch 
fewer objects than the 18-month-olds. 
As specified in the coding criteria, when infants touched one object with another 
object, this was counted as a touch. These touches may be of particular interest in this 
study given that people replicas were included as exemplars from the animate domain. 
One other sequential touching study included people exemplars, but they were only ever 
presented alongside animal exemplars (Oakes, Plumert, Lansink, & Merryman, 1996). In 
the current study the people exemplars were also presented with inanimate exemplars 
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such as vehicles and furniture, which may have promoted more object-to-object touching 
with the people exemplars (e.g., touching a people exemplar on a bed). 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percentage of 
object-to-object touches with people exemplars, out of the total number of touches, across 
the two age groups. The 24-month-olds had a significantly greater percentage of object-
to-object touches involving people exemplars (M = 11.42, SD = 11.25) than the 18-
month-olds (M = 5.77, SD = 8.65), t(66) = -2.29, p = .03. Importantly, the object-to-
object touches involving the people exemplars were far more likely to involve inanimate 
exemplars than animate exemplars. That is, the infants in both age groups were touching 
the people exemplars to the vehicles and furniture (inanimates), rather than to the animals 
or other people exemplars (animates). A breakdown of the percentage of object-to-object 
touches using people exemplars for each age group can be found in Table 2. Using 
independent-samples t-tests, no significant age differences were found when comparing 
the types of exemplars involved in object-to-object touches with people exemplars. 
Given that the vast majority of object-to-object touches with people exemplars 
were to inanimate domain exemplars (i.e., across domain-general categories), this would 
suffice to lower the MRL of the 24-month-olds. For example, if an infant picked up a 
people exemplar and then touched it to a furniture exemplar, the animate run which 
began with the people object would be broken by the touch to the inanimate object. 
Therefore, a high frequency of animate-inanimate sequential touches, specifically people-
inanimate sequential touches in this instance, would increase the number of breaks in the 
infant's sequence of touches, thereby lowering his or her MRL. In the 24-month-old 
sample, a significant negative correlation was found between MRL and percentage of 
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object-to-object touches with people exemplars, r(37) = -.38, p = .02. That is, infants who 
had a lower percentage of object-to-object touches with people exemplars had a higher 
MRL. This correlation was not significant for the 18-month-old sample, r{3\) = -.17, p = 
.39. 
In order to further explore the effect of object-to-object touches with people 
exemplars on MRL, the sequence of touches for each infant was re-coded, and all of 
those touches were removed. For example, if the people exemplar was touched to the 
vehicle exemplar in the sequence man-car-dog-chair, the sequence would become man-
dog-chair. All other coding criteria remained the same. For example, if 10 s had elapsed 
between the man touch and the dog touch, a break would have been recorded between 
those touches in the new sequence. Also, any object-to-object touch that was followed by 
a hand-touch to that same object (e.g., the infant touched the man to the car, then touched 
the car with his or her hand), still remained a touch in the new sequence. After the 
sequences of touches were re-coded, new MRLs were calculated and these values were 
compared to the MRLs from the original sequence using paired-sample t-tests. The 
average MRL for the 18-month-olds increased slightly from 2.02 to 2.04, and this 
increase was not significant, t(30) = -.52, p = .61. The average MRL for the 24-month-
olds had a greater increase from 1.72 to 1.79, but this increase was also not significant, 
r(36) = -1.59,p = .12. 
The 18-month-old infants in this study were found to perform domain-general 
categorization at an above-chance level. This suggests that at least by 18 months of age, 
infants have an understanding of the broad animate/inanimate distinction. The 24-monfh-
olds did not successfully categorize the domain-general objects, which was unexpected 
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given the performance of the 18-month-olds. This age difference was not due to the older 
age group touching fewer objects. However, age differences were found in the object-to-
object touches with the people exemplars. Specifically, the 24-month-old infants had a 
higher percentage of object-to-object touches with people exemplars, and the majority of 
those touches involved inanimate exemplars. These cross-category object-to-object 
touches would increase the number of breaks, thereby decreasing the average MRL for 
the 24-month-olds. The inclusion of people exemplars seemed to promote symbolic play 
in the older age group, making it difficult for them to demonstrate categorization using a 
sequential touching procedure. 
Experiment 1 examined the development of domain-general categories in 18- to 
24-month-old infants. Given that successful domain-general categorization was 
discovered, at least within one of the age groups, it becomes important to examine how 
infants group these broad category items. That is, we can examine the role of perceptual 
and/or conceptual input in the development of this category level. Experiment 2 was 
designed to examine the role that part features might play in the categorization of 
domain-general objects. 
Experiment 2 
A second area of controversy in the categorization literature revolves around a 
perceptual vs. conceptual basis for categorization. The noteworthy results demonstrated 
by Rakison and Butterworth (1998) using switched-part exemplars provided a strong 
endorsement in favour of perceptually-based categorization. However, it first seems 
important to determine whether the results in that study can be replicated. Experiment 2 
investigated the extent to which 14-, 18-, and 24-month-old infants use object parts when 
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categorizing objects. Similar to Rakison and Butterworth (1998), the part features of 
certain objects were modified to examine categorization, this time at the 
animate/inanimate level. The modified objects allowed for an examination of 
categorization from two different perspectives. That is, would categorization be based on 
category membership (i.e., grouping animals and people together despite differences in 
parts), or based on part characteristics (i.e., grouping animals and vehicles together 
because they both have legs)? 
Method 
Participants. 
Thirty-nine 14-month-old infants (M age = 13.73 months, SD = 0.81, range = 
12.26 to 14.79 months), 32 18-month-old infants (M age = 18.51 months, SD = 0.59, 
range = 17.41 to 19.67 months), and 37 24-month old infants (M age = 24.16, SD = 0.99, 
range = 22.72 to 27.70 months) participated in Experiment 2. Two additional 14-month-
old infants participated but were excluded because they did not touch any objects from 
one of the categories (either animate/inanimate or leg/wheel). Two additional 18-month-
olds were tested but excluded due to fussiness (N = 1) and experimenter error (N = 1). 
Finally, three additional 24-month-olds participated but were excluded because of 
experimenter error. The 14-month-old sample consisted of 19 males and 20 females, the 
18-month-old sample consisted of 21 males and 11 females, and the 24-month-old 
sample consisted of 19 males and 18 females. Participants were recruited in the same way 
as described in Experiment 1. Children were from families who spoke either English or 




Small, plastic three-dimensional objects, similar to those in Experiment 1, were 
used. The animate domain exemplars consisted of four people with wheels (Caucasian 
man, Caucasian woman, Caucasian boy, Caucasian girl) and four animals with legs (dog, 
cow, dolphin, eagle). The inanimate domain exemplars consisted of four vehicles with 
legs (truck, car, boat, airplane) and four pieces of furniture with wheels (chair, vanity, 
bed, bathtub; see Figure 2 for a photograph of all exemplars). The objects ranged in size 
from 7.10 x 3.20 x 4.30 cm to 14.10 x 8.30 x 6.10 cm, and were presented to the infant on 
the same tray used in Experiment 1. The same cloth, stopwatch, and recording equipment 
were also used. 
Procedure and Design. 
The objects were combined to create six testing arrays (see Appendix G). Each 
array was made up of eight objects, and could be broken down by category membership 
in two ways. Four of the objects were from the animate domain-general category, and 
four were from the inanimate domain-general category. Also, four of the objects had leg 
features and four of the objects had wheel features. These part features were 
systematically altered such that each domain-general category consisted of half leg-
objects and half wheel-objects. That is, in each array, two animate exemplars had wheels, 
two animate exemplars had legs, two inanimate exemplars had wheels, and two inanimate 
exemplars had legs. 
In order to achieve this counterbalancing, the people objects were altered to have 
wheels instead of legs, while the animal objects remained intact (i.e., had leg features). 
The vehicle objects were altered to have legs instead of wheels, and the furniture objects 
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were given wheels instead of legs. This mix of part features within domain-general 
categories allows for a contrast of animate/inanimate categorization and leg/wheel 
categorization. If the infants were found to perform animate/inanimate categorization at 
an above-chance level, they would be doing so despite differences in object parts (i.e., 
categorizing legged-animals with wheeled-people). However, if the infants were found to 
perform leg/wheel categorization (i.e., categorizing animals with legs with vehicles with 
legs) it would demonstrate a relatively unsophisticated knowledge of animate and 
inanimate categories. 
The same testing procedure was used as in Experiment 1. 
Coding. 
The same coding procedure was used as in Experiment 1, with the addition of 
leg/wheel categorization. After coding was completed for the animate and inanimate 
objects, the sequence of touches was re-coded onto a leg/wheel coding sheet (see 
Appendix H). That is, a touch to an animal object would be coded as an animate touch, 
and then recoded as a leg touch. A touch to a people object would be coded as an animate 
touch, and then recoded as a wheel touch. MRLs were calculated for overall 
animate/inanimate categorization and for overall leg/wheel categorization. The same 
chance value (1.75) was used to determine whether categorization was occurring at a 
level greater than chance. 
As in Experiment 1, an undergraduate-level student, naive to the experimental 
hypotheses, completed the reliability coding. Interrater reliability was determined using 
the animate/inanimate coding sequence, and was calculated based on 25% of the infants 
in each age group (at least one infant from each testing array). Average agreement was 
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89.86% for the 14-month-olds, 93.08% for the 18-month-olds, and 92.06% for the 24-
month-olds. 
Results and Discussion 
One-sample t-tests were used to compare infant MRLs to the MRL expected by 
chance (1.75). Preliminary analyses revealed no significant gender differences in MRL 
for any of the three age groups, and therefore all further analyses were collapsed across 
gender. 
The average animate/inanimate MRL and leg/wheel MRL for each age group are 
presented in Table 3. The 14-month-old infants had an animate/inanimate MRL (M = 
1.59, SD = 0.49) that was below chance, t(3S) = -2.03, p = .05. Their leg/wheel MRL (M 
= 1.83, SD = 0.67) was also not significantly greater than chance, f(38) = 0.76, p = .45. 
The animate/inanimate MRL for the 18-month-old infants (M = 1.65, SD = 0.35) did not 
exceed chance, t(3l) = -1.63, p = .11, and their leg/wheel MRL (M = 1.80, SD = 0.60) 
was not significantly above chance, t(3l) = .52, p = .61. The animate/inanimate MRL for 
the 24-month-olds (M = 1.68, SD = 0.38) was not above chance, r(36) = -1.13, p = .27, 
and their leg/wheel MRL (M = 1.78, SD = 0.42) was not significantly greater than 
chance, t(36) = .44, p = .67. 
A 2 x 3 (Type of MRL x Age Group) mixed analysis of variance was conducted 
to examine the two types of MRL across the three age groups. There was no significant 
main effect of age group, F(2, 105) = .03, p = .97, and no significant interaction between 
age and type of MRL, F(2, 105) = .36, p = .70. There was a significant main effect of 
type of MRL, F(l, 105) = 5.65, p = .02, such that the leg/wheel MRL collapsed across the 
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three age groups (M = 1.81, SD = 0.57) was significantly higher than the 
animate/inanimate MRL collapsed across the three age groups (M - 1.64, SD = 0.41) 
In terms of animate/inanimate categorization, 26% of the 14-month-olds (N= 10), 
38% of the 18-month-old infants (N= 12), and 38% of the 24-month-olds (N= 14) had a 
MRL greater than the chance MRL value of 1.75. In regard to leg/wheel categorization, 
41% of the 14-month-olds (N= 16), 44% of the 18-month-old infants (N= 14), and 38% 
of the 24-month-olds (N = 14) had a MRL greater than chance value. A 2 x 3 (Percentage 
of MRLs Above Chance for Each Type of MRL x Age Group) mixed analysis of 
variance examined the percentage of MRLs above chance for each type of MRL across 
the three age groups. No significant main effect was found for either percentage of MRLs 
above chance for each type of MRL, F(l, 105) = 1.30, p = .26, or age group, F(2, 105) = 
0.38, p = .69. There was also no significant interaction between the two variables, F(2, 
105) = 0.53, p = . 59. 
In order to calculate leg/wheel MRLs, all of the legged exemplars (i.e., animals 
and vehicles) were considered as part of the 'leg' group. However, the dolphin exemplar 
did not have leg features per se, but two fins. It could therefore be argued that this was 
not a fair comparison of part features because the dolphin was missing the feature of 
interest. Previous research with switched-part objects utilized a walrus exemplar in the 
leg category (Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). Also, the fin features on the dolphin 
exemplar were noticeable and could be considered ieg-like.' Of the six testing arrays, 
three included the dolphin exemplar and three did not. The results from these orders were 
collapsed to create two groups: those including the dolphin and those not including the 
dolphin. A 2 x 3 (Dolphin Testing Array x Age Group) between-subjects analysis of 
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variance was conducted to examine whether the dolphin exemplar influenced leg/wheel 
categorization. No significant main effect was found for either age group, F(2, 102) = 
.19, p = .82, or dolphin testing array, F(l, 102) = 1.15, p = .29. There was also no 
significant interaction between age group and dolphin testing array, F(2, 102) = 1.95, p = 
.15. These results suggest that the inclusion of the dolphin exemplar in the leg category 
did not influence leg/wheel categorization for any of the three age groups. 
The 14-, 18-, and 24-month-old infants in this study did not perform either 
animate/inanimate categorization or leg/wheel categorization at a level significantly 
greater than chance. There was no significant difference in the percentage of infants who 
achieved a MRL above chance for either type of categorization. Overall, there was a 
trend for higher leg/wheel MRLs than animate/inanimate MRLs. The results from 
Experiment 2 do not demonstrate evidence of either perceptual or conceptual 
categorization. That is, none of the age groups categorized the conceptual animate and 
inanimate categories. The same was true for perceptual categorization, in that no age 
group categorized the perceptual leg and wheel categories. Conceptual categorization 
would have been especially challenging in this instance, because the same-category 
exemplars had differing part features. However, it is noteworthy that the infants did not 
resort to part-based categorization using the leg and wheel features. 
General Discussion 
Studying categorization allows us to answer fundamental questions about how 
infants begin to see the objects in the world around them. By examining the domain-
general level of categorization, we are exploring the important distinction between living 
and non-living things. Learning about how typically developing children see the world 
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also allows us to examine differences in populations of children who are experiencing 
developmental difficulties. For example, some researchers have examined whether 
typically developing children categorize differently from children with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD). A recent study found that children with ASD began categorizing lower-
level categories before higher-level categories (Frenkiel-Fishman, Poulin-Dubois, & 
Rostad, in preparation), supporting other findings that children with ASD often focus on 
narrower parts of the environment (Klinger & Dawson, 1995). 
Categorization research can also be applied to other areas of child development, 
such as language. For instance, it has been documented that children often overextend 
labels (e.g., calling all furry things "dog;" Samuelson & Smith, 2000). This can reflect 
categorization skills along with language abilities. These knowledge foundations formed 
early in life become the building blocks for all later learning (Mandler & McDonough, 
1998a), and therefore examining how information comes to be organized in infancy is a 
worthwhile pursuit. The current experiments addressed two main areas of contention in 
the categorization literature. 
First, researchers have attempted to determine the level of categorization that 
infants initially acquire. Bottom-up theorists argue that children learn lower-level 
categories first (i.e., basic- and subordinate-level) because they have a high degree of 
within-category similarity (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Top-down supporters believe that 
children first acquire broad categories, and learn to distinguish among the narrower, 
lower-level categories as their age increases (Mandler, 2003). A number of research 
studies have demonstrated that children can distinguish superordinate-level categories 
before basic-level categories (e.g., Mandler & Bauer, 1998; Mandler et al., 1991; 
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Mandler & McDonough, 1993; 1998a). However, only one study has examined 
categories at a greater level of inclusiveness than the superordinate level (Poulin-Dubois 
et al., 2006). 
The first experiment examined whether 18- and 24-month-old infants were 
capable of categorizing objects at the domain-general level using a sequential touching 
procedure. Infants were presented with objects from the animate domain (i.e., people and 
animals) and from the inanimate domain (i.e., vehicles and furniture), and their touching 
behaviour was analyzed. The results showed that the 18-month-olds were categorizing at 
a level significantly greater than chance, but the 24-month-olds were not. These results 
were not due to the 24-month-olds simply touching fewer objects than the 18-month-olds. 
Further analyses revealed that the older infants were engaging in a high degree of object-
to-object touching, specifically touching the people exemplars to the inanimate objects. 
This led to a high number of cross-category touches (i.e., people-vehicle or people-
furniture), which would break any ongoing runs and lower average MRL. For the 24-
month-old sample, a significant negative correlation was found between MRL and 
percentage of object-to-object touches with people exemplars, such that a high percentage 
of those touches was related to lower MRLs. This correlation was not significant in the 
18-month-old sample, suggesting that the relationship between these variables did not 
impact the MRLs of the 18-month-olds as strongly. 
After removing the object-to-object touches with people exemplars, both age 
groups had an increase in their average MRL, with the 24-month-olds having the greatest 
increase. This provides some evidence that a high percentage of object-to-object touches 
with people exemplars does lower MRL. Compared to the 18-month-olds, the 24-month-
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olds in the current study had gained an additional six months of experience with people. 
This experience could have served to improve their appreciation of the people exemplars, 
thus increasing their saliency. Research has demonstrated that symbolic play is only 
beginning to develop at 18 months of age (Tomasello, Striano, & Rochat, 1999), and 
therefore the 24-month-olds in the current study likely had a more advanced 
understanding of symbolic play (i.e., that people toys go on furniture and vehicle toys) 
than the 18-month-olds. 
In order to examine the animate category at the domain-general level, it was 
necessary to include people exemplars along with animal exemplars. However, at least 
for the older infants, this allowed for the possibility of symbolic play with the objects. 
Though the object-to-object touching was certainly appropriate, with a sequential 
touching procedure it would serve to lower the MRLs of the 24-month-olds, making it 
difficult for their average MRLs to exceed chance. One previous study included people 
exemplars in a sequential touching procedure (Oakes et al., 1996). In that study the 
people exemplars were only ever presented alongside animal exemplars, which likely 
minimized any cross-category touches. 
If this study were to be repeated, it would be worthwhile to consider the types of 
inanimate items presented alongside the people exemplars. The furniture items in the 
current study (e.g., bed, bathtub, chair) may have been especially likely to promote 
symbolic play. This is supported by the finding that the furniture items were the most 
frequent partners in the object-to-object touches with the people exemplars (see Table 2). 
Other furniture items such as a lamp, television set, or bookcase may be less attractive for 
symbolic play. If this change led to a decrease in symbolic play and an increase MRLs, it 
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would support the interpretation that the older infants in the current study may have been 
approaching the objects in a symbolic way more than a categorical way. If that was the 
case in die current study, it would explain why removing their symbolic play touches did 
significantly increase their MRLs. 
It should not be concluded from these results that 24-month-old infants are 
incapable of domain-general categorization. It may be that a sequential touching 
procedure which includes people exemplars along with inanimate items may not be 
appropriate for this age group. A technique which presents objects consecutively rather 
than simultaneously, such as an object examination procedure, would eliminate the 
possibility of object-to-object touching. A generalized imitation procedure, where infants 
are given a prop and two objects from different categories, is also often used with older 
infants. Future research in domain-general categorization should be extended to use these 
alternative procedures with older age groups, as well as to examine whether domain-
general categorization can be found in infants younger than 18 months of age. 
Previous research using a sequential touching task has found that infants from 12 
to 30 months of age will sequentially touch items from the same basic- and 
superordinate-level categories (e.g., Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler et al„ 1991; Oakes 
et al., 1996). The 18-month-olds in the current study also sequentially touched items from 
the same domain-general categories of animates and inanimates. However, it has been 
argued that sequential touches are not the only way to demonstrate categorization. 
Alternate touching may also be a demonstration of successful categorization (Oakes & 
Plumert, 2002). That is, a touch pattern of animate-inanimate-animate-inanimate-
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animate-inanimate could indeed be a categorization strategy, only in a dividing pattern 
rather than a connecting pattern. 
It would be impossible to attempt to interpret an infant's touching pattern in terms 
of both sequential touching and alternate touching. That is, one could not conclude that 
an infant was demonstrating categorization with both an animate-inanimate alternate 
touch and an animate-animate sequential touch, otherwise all back-to-back touches would 
be evidence of categorization. However, it may be possible to observe a change in 
touching patterns over time as infants become familiar with the task and switch to more 
sophisticated categorization strategies (Oakes & Plumert, 2002). It remains unclear 
though how to determine whether the 24-month-olds in this study could have been 
displaying both sequential and alternate categorization strategies. 
In addition, some authors argue that the initial response to the objects in a 
sequential touching task is not what should be taken as evidence of categorization (Oakes 
& Madole, 2000). For instance, Oakes et al. (1996) found that 13-month-old infants did 
engage in successive touching after 2 min with the objects, but not before. Therefore, it 
may be that infants come to notice or discover the category distinctions after having time 
to engage with and explore the objects, a unique opportunity in a sequential touching 
task. Future research using a sequential touching procedure may benefit from a 
familiarization phase in which the infants are presented with the objects prior to the task, 
or simply a longer sequential touching period (Oakes & Plumert, 2002). 
Some researchers believe that studies using toy objects are not representative of 
how infants function in the real world, arguing that infants do not appreciate toy objects 
as representations of their real world counterparts (Johnson, Younger, & Furrer, 2005). If 
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infants and young children are unable to appreciate that toys are symbols for real things, 
examining their categorization skills using toys would seem to be an unworthy pursuit if 
the goal is to understand how they categorize in everyday life. Research using scale 
models as representations has found that children younger than 2!/2 years of age have 
some difficulty representing the 'dual' nature of the symbols as both things in and of 
themselves and as representations of other things (e.g., DeLoache, 1989; DeLoache & 
Marzolf, 1992). More recent research has also shown that 18- to 20-month-old infants 
can be relatively poor at understanding objects as symbols (e.g., Tomasello et al., 1999; 
Younger & Johnson, 2006). 
However, other research has shown that even young infants are capable of seeing 
links between symbolic representations and real-world counterparts. DeLoache, 
Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren, and Gottlieb (1998) found that 9-month-old infants 
would investigate and touch pictures as if they were the real objects. Younger and 
Johnson (2004) found an understanding of symbolic relations between toys and real-
world counterparts by 14 months of age. While testing infants in the current experiments, 
appropriate vocalizations were common (e.g., saying "woof when touching the dog). 
Also, the cross-category touching that occurred with the people exemplars and the 
inanimate items in Experiment 1 seems to demonstrate knowledge of how the objects 
would interact in the real world. It seems fair to argue then that even young infants have 
some understanding of objects as symbolic representations of real things, and that the 
results from the current studies could be applied to real-world functioning. 
The second experiment was designed to address a different area of debate in the 
categorization literature, specifically, the degree to which infants use perceptual vs. 
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conceptual information when making category distinctions. Perceptual theorists make the 
argument that perceptual features, such as visible object parts, are the basis for 
categorization, especially in early infancy (e.g., Rakison, 2003). Conceptual theorists 
believe that even young infants are capable of using more conceptual, nonobvious 
information when making category judgments, such as functional, causal, or structural 
properties (e.g., Mandler, 2003). 
In Experiment 2,14-, 18-, and 24-month old infants were presented with objects 
from animate and inanimate domain-general categories. However, as opposed to the 
unmodified objects used in Experiment 1, the part features of certain objects were 
modified in Experiment 2. The animal exemplars remained intact (i.e., had leg features), 
the people exemplars had wheels, the vehicle exemplars had legs, and the furniture 
exemplars had wheels. These modifications allowed for a direct comparison of category-
based categorization (i.e., animate and inanimate exemplars) and part-based 
categorization (i.e., leg and wheel exemplars). None of the age groups displayed either 
category-based or part-based categorization at a level significantly above chance. 
The lack of significant leg/wheel categorization, especially in the younger age 
group, is noteworthy. Previous research using switched-part objects in a sequential 
touching procedure found that 14-month-old infants performed part-based categorization 
to a very high degree for superordinate-level categories such as animals and vehicles 
(Rakison & Butterworth, 1998). In fact, the average leg/wheel MRL for the 14-month-
olds in that study (M = 4.88) is higher than any MRL found in any other study at any 
level of categorization, using either unmodified or switched-part objects. 
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It could be that part-based categorization is less suitable for domain-general 
category exemplars than for superordinate-level exemplars, given that domain-general 
categories are broader and contain more within-category variability. At a low level of 
categorization (e.g., basic-level category of 'dog'), using parts as the basis for 
categorization may be less likely to lead to inaccurate categorization decisions. That is, 
members of the same basic-level category do indeed have many similar part features (i.e., 
all dogs have many part features in common, despite other perceptual differences such as 
size or color). As you move up the levels of categorization, part-based categorization 
becomes less appropriate. Even at the superordinate-level, category members still have 
some common part features. Dogs and birds both have legs and cars and bicycles both 
have wheels, even though they differ in number. 
However, once you reach the domain-general level of categorization the number 
of part-based features in common decreases even further. Especially in the inanimate 
domain, the part features that could be used to group vehicles and furniture together are 
almost nonexistent. Therefore, this wider amount of variability found at the domain-
general level of categorization could make part-based categorization an inappropriate 
strategy, more so than it would have been at the superordinate level in the Rakison and 
Butterworth (1998) study. 
It may also be that modifying the people exemplars to have wheels could have 
been too peculiar for the infants in the current study, such that no categorization strategy 
seemed appropriate. However, animals with wheels and vehicles with legs are also out of 
the ordinary, and the 14- and 18-month-old infants presented with these configurations in 
the Rakison and Butterworth (1998) study reverted to part-based categorization. The 22-
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month-old infants in that study were actually able to overcome the modified part features 
and begin to categorize based on animal and vehicle category membership. Therefore, an 
explanation that the objects in the current study were too unusual seems insufficient to 
explain the lack of significant categorization. 
The differing results may potentially be due to differences in the way that the part 
features were modified. As can be seen in Figure 2, the objects in the current study were 
modified with the intent to change only the requisite leg and wheel part features. 
However, Rakison and Butterworth (1998) modified their objects to be more like 
animal/vehicle hybrids. For the animal exemplars, the top half of animal objects were 
attached to the bottom half of vehicle objects, which included platforms along with the 
wheels (i.e., not simply attaching the wheels to the side of the animals where the legs 
were removed). For the vehicle exemplars, the top half of vehicle objects were attached 
to the bottom half of animal objects, which included stomach/midsection areas along with 
the legs (i.e., not simply attaching the legs to the bottom of the vehicles where the wheels 
used to be). 
There may have been extra focus placed on the part features in Rakison and 
Butterworth (1998) because of the inclusion of additional body parts, which would not be 
the case in the current study. If it is true that a difference in object modification 
influenced categorization, it would demonstrate that perceptually-based categorization 
can be quite fragile. This argument would favour the conceptual theorists, who believe 
that conceptually based categorization is more consistent and less likely to lead to 
inaccurate conclusions about which objects belong together (Mandler, 2003). 
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Another methodological difference from the Rakison and Butterworth (1998) 
study is the breakdown of the objects that were modified. In Rakison and Butterworth 
(1998), two animals had legs, two animals had wheels, two vehicles had legs and two 
vehicles had wheels. However, in the current study, the people had wheels, the animals 
had legs, the furniture had wheels, and the vehicles had legs. Therefore, both of the items 
from the same superordinate-level category had the same part feature. In future studies, 
the features could be modified such that one exemplar from each superordinate-level 
category had legs and the other had wheels (i.e., one people with legs, one people with 
wheels, one animal with legs, one animal with wheels, etc.). With the current design, the 
infants may have been looking at the objects as four sets of two category members, rather 
than two sets of four category members. 
The results from Experiment 1 indicate that 18-month-old infants are capable of 
domain-general categorization with unmodified objects. It would therefore be expected 
that at some point infants should be able to perform domain-general categorization even 
with switched-part objects, as did the 22-month-old infants in the Rakison and 
Butterworth (1998) study with superordinate-level exemplars. It could be that this ability 
develops after 24 months of age. It could also be that the modifications in the current 
study (i.e., solely part features rather than hybrid objects) created objects that did not fit 
into any recognizable structure. Although the modifications in Rakison and Butterworth 
(1998) can be criticized for drawing extra attention to part features, the objects in their 
study may have been more comprehensible. For example, including some of the animal 
body allowed the vehicles in that study to have a smoother transition from top to bottom. 
Were these to be real entities, they might actually look like they could move and 
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function. In the current study, the vehicle objects ended abruptly where the legs were 
attached. The people objects ended at the waist where the wheels were attached. These 
modifications may have made the objects somehow unrecognizable, and therefore 
incomparable to any category scheme. 
These experiments were among the first to examine a level of categorization 
above the superordinate level. The animate and inanimate domain-general categories 
have hardly been explored, despite some researchers arguing that the animate-inanimate 
distinction is learned relatively early in infancy (Rakison, 2003; Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2001). The results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that during the middle of the 
second year of life, infants are capable of distinguishing these domain-general categories. 
Experiment 2 found a lack of either category-based or part-based categorization with 
modified objects. Further research will be required to clarify the basis for early infant 
categories (i.e., perceptual or conceptual categorization), but we now know more about 
the progression of category acquisition in terms of category inclusiveness. 
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The Child Development Laboratory at Concordia University is involved in a 
series of studies looking at infants' understanding of animacy. This research is funded by 
the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. The Commission 
d'Acces a l'lnformation du Quebec has kindly given us permission to consult birthlists 
provided by the Regie Regionale de la Sante et des Services Sociaux de la Region de 
Montreal-Centre. Your name appears on the birthlist of , which indicates that 
you have a child of an age appropriate for our study. 
In the present study, we are examining infants' understanding of living beings and 
inanimate objects. Your child will be presented with a selection of toys to play with for 
two minutes to assess his or her categorization skills. During this task, your child will be 
sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. A video camera will be used 
to record the tasks, so that we can measure how long your child plays with the toys. 
Participation involves one visit to our research centre on the Loyola Campus of 
Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. Appointments can be 
scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, including weekends. 
Free parking is available on the campus for our participants, and we will gladly reimburse 
any other transportation expenses at the time of your visit. Upon completion of the study, 
a Certificate of Merit will be given to your child, and a report of the results of the study 
will be mailed to you as soon as it is completed 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are months of 
age, who hear English or French spoken at home, and who do not have any visual or 
hearing difficulties. If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or 
would like any further information, please contact Kristin Rostad at 514-848-2424, ext. 
2279 or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at 514-848-2424, ext. 2219. We will try to contact you 
by telephone within a few days of your receipt of this letter. 
Thank you for your interest and collaboration. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Kristin Rostad, B.A. 
Professor M.A. Candidate 
Psychology Department Psychology Department 
diane.poulindubois@concordia.ca k_rostad@alcor.concordia.ca 
Appendix B 
Informed Consent Form 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being 
conducted by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois and Kristin Rostad of Concordia University. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine how infants 
understand living beings and inanimate objects. 
B. PROCEDURES 
The present investigation involves examining how infants categorize objects in the 
world around them, and the strategies they are most likely to use. Your child will be 
presented with a series of small toys from different categories of objects and we will 
measure how long he/she touches each of them. During this task, your child will be 
sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape your 
child's responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. That 
means that the researcher will not reveal your child's identity in any written or oral 
reports about this study. Your child will be assigned a coded number, and that number 
will be used on all data collected in this study. 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you 
for his/her participation. 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child's participation. There are no procedures in this 
investigation that inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of 
Quebec and Canada, if the researchers discover information that indicates the 
possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent harm, they 
are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for 
this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at any time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter 
will gladly answer any questions that might arise during the course of the 
research. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e., the researchers 
will know, but will not disclose my identity). 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual 
scores will be reported. 
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I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE 
MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
MY CHILD'S NAME (please print) 
MY NAME (please print) 
SIGNATURE DATE. 
WITNESSED BY DATE 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are 
free to contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 
University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Kristin Rostad, B.A. 
Professor M.A. Candidate 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 





Infant's first name: Date of Birth: 
Infant's last name: Gender: 
Language(s) spoken at home: 
Mother's name: Father's name: 
Address: Telephone #: home 
work 
Mother's occupation: Father's occupation: 
Mother's education (highest level attained): 
Father's education (highest level attained): 
Mother's marital status: • Father's marital status: 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child: 
Birth weight: Length of pregnancy: weeks 
Birth order: (e.g., 1 = 1st child) Number of children in family: 
Were there any complications during the pregnancy? 
Has your child had any major medical problems? 
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems? 
Please answer the following general information questions about your family: 
Does your family have a pet (or pets)? (yes/no) 
If you answered yes, please list your pet(s) indicating the kind of pet(s) (e.g., dog, cat, 
fish) and the number of pets: 
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African American man 
Caucasian girl 
African American woman 
African American girl 
_, , . Caucasian girl Order 4 _ . f Caucasian boy 
African American man 
African American boy 








































Blank Animate/Inanimate Coding Sheet 
Subject Number: Sex: F M Tested by: Order: 
Birth date: Test date: Coder: Coding date: 





1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 13 14 Touches Runs MRL 
Total Touches: Total Runs: Total MRL: 
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10 J elapsed between touches 















Simultaneous touch to same-category 


















Highlight indicates that car 
was touched using another 
object (man) 
Total Touches = 14 Total Runs = 7 





















































































Total Touches = 6 Total Runs = 2 

























Total Touches = 6 Total Runs = 5 
Total Leg/Wheel MRL = 6 =1.20 
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Table 1 
Mean Run Lengths, Standard Deviations, and Associated t-Test Values in Experiment 1 
18-month-olds 24-month-olds 
M SD /(30) M SD t(36) 
2.02* 0.73 2.07 1.72 0.42 -.43 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent degrees of freedom. 
* Indicates significantly above chance MRL (1.75), p < .05 (one-tailed) 
55 
Table 2 
Percentage of Animal, People, Vehicle, and Furniture Objects Touched Using People 
Exemplars in Experiment 1 
Animal People Vehicle Furniture 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
18-month-olds 10.26 28.50 0.00 0.00 16.35 37.29 73.40 42.88 
24-month-olds 4.47 10.36 0.00 0.00 10.64 21.34 84.89 23.84 
56 
Table 3 
Mean Run Lengths, Standard Deviations, and Associated t-Test Values in Experiment 2 
14-month-olds 18-month-olds 24-month-olds 
TypeofMRL M S~D r(38) M SD *(31) M SD /(36) 
Animate/Inanimate 1.59 0.49 -2.03 1.65 0.35 -1.63 1.68 0.38 -1.13 
Leg/Wheel 1.83 0.67 0.76 1.80 0.60 0.52 1.78 0.42 0.44 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent degrees of freedom. 
* Indicates significantly above chance MRL (1.75), p < .05 (one-tailed) 
57 





Figure 2. Experiment 2 Stimuli 
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